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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
James M. McCauley *
I. AMENDMENTS TO THE VIRGINIA RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
A. Multijurisdictional Practice
The growing ease of interstate and international travel, the ad-
vancements in electronic communications and the resulting glo-
balization of economic activity have made it ever more necessary
for lawyers to expand the geographic scope of their practices.
Both law firms and their clients increasingly conduct business on
a nationwide and even worldwide scale. As the Commission on
Multijurisdictional Practice recognized in 2002, "the geographic
scope of a lawyer's practice must be adequate to enable the law-
yer to serve the legal needs of clients in a national and global
economy."' Thus lawyers need to be more able than previously to
practice in multiple jurisdictions.
To this end, the Supreme Court of Virginia adopted new provi-
sions to permit limited practice by foreign lawyers in the Com-
monwealth. These provisions included the adoption of a foreign
legal consultant rule for lawyers admitted to practice in a foreign
nation and a temporary practice rule for lawyers admitted in a
foreign country or in a territory or state in the United States oth-
er than Virginia.
1. Foreign Legal Consultant
Effective January 1, 2009, the Supreme Court of Virginia
adopted Rule 1A:7 allowing lawyers admitted to the bar of a for-
* Ethics Counsel, Virginia State Bar. J.D., 1982, University of Richmond School of
Law; B.A., 1978, James Madison University.
1. AM. BAR AsS'N, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE 2
(2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjplintro-cover.pdf.
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eign country to become certified in Virginia as "foreign legal con-
sultants" ("FLCs"). In 1993, the American Bar Association
("ABA") House of Delegates approved the Model Rule for the Li-
censing and Practice of Foreign Legal Consultants ("Model
Rule") , which addresses the work of foreign lawyers in United
States jurisdictions.4 The Model Rule responded, in part, to the
concern of foreign lawyers that, while American lawyers enjoyed
a broad right of practice in other countries (or sought such a right
in countries that did not afford it), foreign lawyers generally could
not engage in the practice of law in the United States.5 Even if
their practice is limited to advising on the law of their own coun-
tries, foreign lawyers must first attend an accredited American
law school, sit for the bar examination, and become a full member
of the Virginia State Bar.6 The ABA identified both a need for a
streamlined admissions process for foreign lawyers seeking to es-
tablish a law practice providing limited legal services and a need
for greater uniformity.7 Currently, thirty-one jurisdictions have
an FLC rule."
The new Virginia FLC rule, effective January 1, 2009,' carves
out a rather limited role for the FLC permitting her to render le-
gal services only with regard to matters involving the law of the
foreign nation(s) in which the person is admitted to practice, or
international law.'0 They are not authorized to appear in court.n
Finally, an FLC cannot hold herself out as a member of the bar.2
2. See VA. SUP. CT. R. pts. 1A, 1A:7 (Repl. Vol. 2010).
3. MODEL RULE FOR THE LICENSING AND PRACTICE OF FOREIGN LEGAL CONSULTANTS
annot. (1993) (amended 2006).
4. Id. § 1.
5. See Carol A. Needham, The Licensing of Foreign Legal Consultants in the United
States, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1126, 1127 (1998).
6. See AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 1, at 2-3 (discussing "unauthorized practice of law"
provisions that prohibit a lawyer "from engaging in the practice of law except in states in
which they are licensed or otherwise authorized").
7. Id. at 8.
8. See AM. BAR ASS'N CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
CoMM., FOREIGN LEGAL CONSULTANT RULES (2009), available at http://www.abanet.org/
cpr/mjp/for1egal-consultants.pdf
9. VA. SUP. CT. R. pts. 1A, 1A:7(l) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
10. Id. R. 1A:7(d) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
11. Id.
12. Id. pt. 6, § II, R. 5.5(d)(2)(ii) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
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2. Temporary Practice by U.S. Lawyers Not Admitted to the
Virginia State Bar
The amendments to Rules 5.5 and 8.5 are the work product of
the Virginia State Bar's Task Force on Multijurisdictional Prac-
tice ("MJP Task Force").13 These amendments became effective
March 1, 2009.14 The MJP Task Force was created to study for-
eign attorney practice in Virginia and make recommendations
concerning the requirements under which non-Virginia lawyers
should be permitted to practice in Virginia.'5 One of the foremost
tasks of the MJP Task Force was to develop rules that define and
regulate temporary practice in Virginia by lawyers who are not
members of the Virginia State Bar.'6 The amendment to Rule 5.5
addresses criteria for temporary practice and unauthorized prac-
tice of law in Virginia by foreign attorneys in Virginia.', The
amendment to Rule 8.5 addresses the disciplinary authority and
jurisdiction of the Virginia State Bar over foreign attorneys prac-
ticing in Virginia.',
a. Rule 5.5: Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional
Practice of Law
Virginia's Rule 5.5 is patterned after ABA Model Rule 5.5.9 As
of January 25, 2010, forty-three states have adopted rules iden-
tical or similar to the ABA rule.20 Rule 5.5 regulates the unautho-
rized practice of law in Virginia by non-Virginia licensed attor-
neys, both those from other U.S. jurisdictions and those licensed
in foreign countries. Prior to the adoption of the amendment to
13. AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 1, at 5-6.
14. R. 5.5 note, R. 8.5 note (Repl. Vol. 2010).
15. See Barbara J. Balogh & James M. McCauley, Multijurisdictional Practice in Vir-
ginia, VA. LAW., June/July 2005, at 52, 52.
16. Id.
17. R. 5.5(d) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
18. Id. R. 8.5(a) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
19. Compare id. R. 5.5 (Repl. Vol. 2010), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
5.5 (1983) (amended 2007). They serve as models for the ethics rules of most states. Pre-
face to the 2010 Edition of AM. BAR ASS'N CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, at ix (2010 ed.). Before the adoption of the Model Rules, the
ABA model was the 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility. Id. at ix-x. Preceding
the Model Code were the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics. Id. at ix.
20. See AM. BAR ASS'N, STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF ABA MODEL RULE 5.5 (2010), http:
//www.abanet.org/cpr/mjplquick-guide_5.5.pdf.
21. R. 5.5(d) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
2010]1 349
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Rule 5.5, unauthorized practice of law by foreign attorneys was
regulated and monitored by the Virginia State Bar's Standing
Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law ("UPL Commit-
tee") and part six, section I(C) of the Rules of the Supreme Court
of Virginia.2 2 Rule 5.5 now makes practice by non-Virginia li-
censed lawyers, other than as authorized by the rule, a discipli-
nary matter.23 The UPL Committee will deal only with unautho-
rized practice of law by foreign attorneys. 24 Foreign lawyers who
engage in temporary practice in Virginia are subject to the Vir-
ginia Rules of Professional Conduct and submit to the jurisdiction
of the Virginia State Bar.2 5
Rule 5.5 authorizes a foreign lawyer to provide legal services in
Virginia on a "temporary and occasional basis" only if they are:
(1) undertaken in association with a licensed Virginia lawyer who
actively participates in the matter; (2) related to a pending or po-
tential proceeding in Virginia or another jurisdiction if the lawyer
is authorized to appear or expects to be so authorized; (3) related
to mediation or arbitration in Virginia or another jurisdiction if
such services are related to the lawyer's practice in his licensing
jurisdiction and do not require pro hac vice admission; or (4) re-
lated to representation of a client in the foreign lawyer's licensing
jurisdiction or a jurisdiction governed by international law. 26
Rule 5.5 prohibits a lawyer from establishing "an office or other
systematic and continuous presence in Virginia," except as autho-
rized by other Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. 27 The
rule retains the longstanding restrictions under the current Rule
5.5 regarding the employment of a lawyer whose license has been
suspended or revoked.2
22. Id. R. 5.5 note (Repl. Vol. 2010) (Prior Rule Comparison).
23. Id. R. 5.5 cmt. 19 (Repl. Vol. 2010).
24. Id. R. 5.5 note (Repl. Vol. 2010) (Prior Rule Comparison).
25. Id. R. 8.5(a) (Repl. Vol. 2010) ("A lawyer not admitted in Virginia is also subject to
the disciplinary authority of Virginia if the lawyer provides, holds himself out as provid-
ing, or offers to provide legal services in Virginia.").
26. Id. R. 5.5(d)(4) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
27. Id. R. 5.5(d)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
28. Id. R. 5.5(a), (b) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
350 [Vol. 45:347
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b. Rule 8.5: Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law
Rule 8.5, patterned after ABA Model Rule 8.5, addresses discip-
linary authority and choice of law in disciplinary cases, and pro-
vides enforcement authority for lawyers engaged in temporary
practice under Rule 5.5.29 As of January 25, 2010, forty-four states
have adopted rules identical or similar to the ABA rule.30 The
amendment to Virginia Rule 8.5 extends the Virginia State Bar's
disciplinary authority over any lawyer who provides or holds her-
self out as providing legal services in Virginia regardless of where
the lawyer is licensed .' Under Rule 8.5, a lawyer not admitted in
Virginia who provides or holds herself out as providing legal ser-
vices in Virginia, shall consent to appointment of the Clerk of the
Supreme Court of Virginia as her agent for disciplinary service of
process. 32
If a foreign lawyer is subject to investigation and discipline by
the Virginia State Bar, the choice of law to be applied in a discip-
linary matter will be: (1) the rules of the court, agency, or tribun-
al if the conduct in question occurred in connection with a matter
before such court, agency, or tribunal; (2) for any other conduct,
the rules of the jurisdiction where the conduct occurred; or (3) the
Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, if the lawyer provides or
holds himself out as providing legal services in Virginia.33 The
ABA Model Rule provides for a choice of law where the conduct
had its "predominant effect";3 4 however, the MJP Task Force
chose not to include this in the Virginia rule revision because it
believed that where the conduct occurred provided a brighter line
for enforcement than the "predominant effect" test.35
29. Compare id. R. 8.5(a)-(b) (Repl. Vol. 2010), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 8.5 (1983) (amended 2002). Rule 5.5 authorizes the limited practice of law by
foreign lawyers in the Commonwealth of Virginia. R. 5.5(d) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
30. See AM. BAR ASs'N, STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF MODEL RULE 8.5 (2010), http://
www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp/quick-guide_8.5.pdf.
31. R. 8.5(a) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
32. Id.
33. Id. R. 8.5(b)(1)-(3) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
34. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5 (1983) (amended 2002).
35. See R. 8.5 note (Repl. Vol. 2010) (Committee Commentary).
2010] 351
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B. Rule 1.17: Sale of a Law Practice
Rule 1.17 establishes the procedure under which a lawyer may
sell or purchase a law practice and its goodwill, partially or in its
entirety, but requires the seller to cease practicing law in the
geographic area in which the practice has been conducted.36 As
originally written, the rule prohibited the seller from practicing
law entirely in the geographical area, even when that seller sold
only a particular portion of the practice but retained other por-
tions.17 To give effect to the seller's ability to sell a particular por-
tion of the practice, effective January 4, 2010, the seller may con-
tinue practicing in those areas that were not sold in the
geographical area where the practice was conducted.38 In other
words, the rule amendment prohibits the selling lawyer from en-
gaging in the private practice of law in the geographic area only
with respect to the particular practice area that has been sold.39 As
amended, the rule will require a lawyer selling his practice to sell
the entire practice or area of practice to prevent the buyer from
retaining the most attractive or lucrative cases at the expense of
clients with less appealing cases, thereby protecting clients who
may find it difficult to secure substitute counsel.40
C. Rules 1.9 and 1.11: Conflicts of Interest in Moving From
Private Practice to Public Employment
Conflict of interest problems may arise when a lawyer moves
from private to government practice. For example, Lawyer A is in
private practice and defends Client in a criminal case. Client is
convicted and appeals to the Virginia Court of Appeals. While the
case is on appeal, Lawyer A leaves private practice and joins the
local Commonwealth Attorney's office. The Court of Appeals re-
verses and remands Client's case to the trial court for retrial. The
Commonwealth Attorney's office that Lawyer A joined is respon-
sible for the retrial of that case. Assuming Lawyer A has a con-
flict and cannot prosecute the case, are all the other prosecutors
in the same office disqualified?
36. Id. R. 1.17(a) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
37. Id. R. 1.17(a) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
38. Id. R. 1.17(a) & note (Repl. Vol. 2010).
39. Id. R. 1.17(a) & cmt. 5 (Repl. Vol. 2010).
40. Id. R. 1.17(b) & cmt. 6 (Repl. Vol. 2010).
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Effective January 4, 2010, the court approved amendments to
Rules 1.9 and 1.11 to make clear that Rule 1.11(d), rather than
Rule 1.9, applies to conflicts of interest created when a lawyer
moves from private practice to public employment.4 ' Rule 1.9 is
the general conflict of interest rule that applies when a lawyer
represents a client directly adverse to a former client in the same
or a substantially related matter.4 2 Conflicts under Rule 1.9 are
imputed to all the other lawyers working in the same law firm or
office.43 Rule 1.11 controls conflicts created when lawyers move
from private to public practice and vice versa. 44 Rule 1.11(d) pro-
hibits Lawyer A from prosecuting the former client if Lawyer A
was "personally and substantially [involved with the matter]
while in private practice."45 However, this conflict is not imputed
to the other prosecutors in the office who may prosecute Client
and therefore, appointment of a special prosecutor is not neces-
sary. 46
D. Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation-Sunsetting of Standing
Committee on Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation
Effective January 22, 2010, the Supreme Court of Virginia dis-
continued the Standing Committee on Lawyer Advertising and
Solicitation and, in cases where disciplinary enforcement is
deemed necessary, transferred the responsibility of monitoring
and enforcing the rules regarding lawyer advertising and solicita-
tion to the Standing Committee on Legal Ethics and the Office of
Bar Counsel.47 Much of the monitoring of lawyer advertising is
staff generated and includes reviewing lawyer advertising com-
municated via all media including print, television, radio, and In-
41. Compare id. R. 1.9 & cmt. 5 (Repl. Vol. 2010), and id. R. 1.11 (Repl. Vol. 2010),
with id. R. 1.9 (Repl. Vol. 2009), and R. 1.11 (Repl. Vol. 2009).
42. R. 1.9(a) (Repl. Vol. 2010) ("A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a
matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially re-
lated matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the
former client unless both the present and former client consent after consultation.").
43. Id. R. 1.10(a) (Repl. Vol. 2010) ("While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of
them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be
prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.6, 1.7, 1.9, or 2.10(e).").
44. Id. R. 1.11 (Repl. Vol. 2010).
45. Id. R. 1.11(d)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
46. Id. R. 1.11(e) (Repl. Vol. 2010) ("Paragraph (d) does not disqualify other lawyers in
the disqualified lawyer's agency.").
47. Alan S. Anderson, Standing Committee on Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation,
VA. ST. B. (Aug. 27, 2009), http://www.vsb.org/site/about/lawyer-advertising-080 9 .
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ternet. 8 The Virginia State Bar staff issues a proactive non-
compliance letter that informs the lawyer that his advertisement
does not comply with an applicable rule.49 The staff requests the
lawyer to rectify the noncompliance problem in exchange for clos-
ing the informal investigation, which creates no disciplinary
record for the lawyer. 0 This approach keeps most lawyer adver-
tising issues out of the disciplinary process except in rare cases of
recalcitrant lawyers who refuse to rectify the problem informally
or lawyers who engage in a pattern of repeated violations of the
same rule.
II. DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
A. Lack of Competence; Filing Frivolous Pleadings
The Virginia State Bar filed disciplinary charges against a
lawyer for filing a frivolous lawsuit against a physician on behalf
of a medical malpractice plaintiff.5' The lawyer elected to have the
disciplinary case tried by a three-judge court, which imposed a
public reprimand and found that the lawyer violated Rule 3.1 of
the Rules of Professional Conduct.52 On an appeal of right, the
Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the three-judge court's deci-
sion because the defendant physician had no involvement with
the plaintiffs surgery or medical care.'2 In fact, the defendant
physician had no staff privileges at the hospital and was not
present where the plaintiffs surgery was performed.54 The court
noted that the lawyer never attempted to contact or request med-
ical records from the physician to verify whether this particular
doctor had participated in the plaintiffs surgery or that the plain-
tiff had ever been his patient.66 In defense of the disciplinary
charges, the lawyer claimed that he relied on an operative report
48. See Alison P. Landry, Standing Committee on Lawyer Advertising and Solicita-
tion, VA. ST. B., http://www.vsb.org/docs/69AP/2007_A-RSCOLAS.pdf (last visited Oct. 30,
2010).
49. See Anderson, supra note 47.
50. See id.
51. Weatherbee v. Va. State Bar ex rel. Fourth Dist.-Section I Comm., 279 Va. 303,
305, 307, 689 S.E.2d 753, 754, 755 (2010).
52. Id. at 305-06, 689 S.E.2d at 754.
53. Id. at 309, 689 S.E.2d at 756.
54. Id.
55. Id.
354 [Vol. 45:347
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that indicated that a "Bob Vaughan" had assisted in the surgery.6
From a website maintained by the Virginia Board of Medicine,
the lawyer deduced that the only Dr. Vaughan practicing in the
Winchester area was a Dr. Ward P. Vaughan and assumed this
was the doctor identified in the operative report.5 1 Consequently,
the lawyer filed suit against this doctor on that basis.58 The law-
suit damaged the doctor's reputation and had an adverse effect on
his medical practice.59 The court found that there were simple
tasks the lawyer failed to perform that would have informed him
that the doctor he sued had no involvement with his client's
care. 60 The court concluded that the lawsuit had no basis in fact or
law and was frivolous within the meaning of Rule 3.1.61 In Wea-
therbee v. Virginia State Bar ex rel. Fourth Dist.-Section I
Comm., the Supreme Court gave some guidance as to what con-
stitutes a "frivolous" lawsuit under Rule 3.1 by quoting one of the
rule's comments:
The filing of an action or defense or similar action taken for a client
is not frivolous merely because the facts have not first been fully
substantiated or because the lawyer expects to develop vital evidence
only by discovery. Such action is not frivolous even though the law-
yer believes that the client's position ultimately will not prevail. The
action is frivolous, however, if the client desires to have the action
taken primarily for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring
a person, or if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith ar-
gument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action
taken by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or re-
versal of existing law.6 2
In another recent case, plaintiff Moseley filed suit on behalf of
Ammons against the Christian Coalition of America alleging
breach of a contract.6 3 The contract contained a provision requir-
56. Id. at 307, 689 S.E.2d at 755.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 308, 689 S.E.2d at 756.
60. Id. at 309, 689 S.E.2d at 756.
61. Id. at 309-10, 689 S.E.2d at 756. Rule 3.1 states: "A lawyer shall not bring or de-
fend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing
so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modifica-
tion or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the
respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend
the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be established." VA. SUP. CT. R.
pt. 6, § II, R. 3.1 (Repl. Vol. 2010).
62. 279 Va. at 309, 689 S.E.2d at 756 (quotingR. 3.1 cmt. 2. (Repl. Vol. 2010)).
63. Moseley v. Va. State Bar ex rel. Seventh Dist. Comm., 280 Va. 1, 1, 694 S.E.2d
2010] 355
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ing arbitration in the event of a dispute.64 A circuit court sanc-
tioned Moseley and Ammons because they held an evidentiary
hearing regarding the existence of an agreement to arbitrate in
spite of the fact that they knew Ammons' employment contract
contained an arbitration clause.15 Moseley argued that although a
contract existed, Ammons did not have a copy, and therefore was
unsure if the contract contained an arbitration clause.66 On cross-
examination, however, Ammons admitted that he gave a copy of
the contract to Moseley.67 The circuit court also reprimanded
Ammons and Moseley, who filed in excess of eighty pleadings and
motions in the case, for using abusive discovery tactics and filing
frivolous pleadings.6 1 The circuit court stated that Ammons and
Moseley conducted the proceeding without any basis and with the
goal "to specifically harm, deter, and harass the Defendant
through vexatious litigation."69 Moseley and Ammons were sanc-
tioned and ordered to pay attorney's fees and costs. 70 The circuit
court revoked Moseley's right to practice before that court, Mose-
ley appealed, and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed.7' In this
disciplinary proceeding, a three-judge court found that Moseley
had violated Rules 3.3(a)(1), 3.4(e), 3.4(j), 4.1(a), 8.2, and 8.4(a),
(b), and (c).72 The panel suspended Moseley's license to practice
586, 588 (2010).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1-2, 694 S.E.2d at 588.
69. Id. at 2, 694 S.E.2d at 588 (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1-2, 694 S.E.2d at 588; see also In re Moseley, 273 Va. 688, 690-91, 643
S.E.2d 190, 191 (2007) (affirming the Arlington County Circuit Court's decision to revoke
Moseley's privilege to practice before it).
72. 280 Va. at 2, 694 S.E.2d at 589 (applying VA. S. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 3.3(a)(1) (Repl.
Vol. 2010) (providing that "[a] lawyer shall not knowingly ... make a false statement of
fact or law to a tribunal"); id. R. 3.4(e) (Repl. Vol. 2010) ("A lawyer shall not ... [m]ake a
frivolous discovery request or fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a le-
gally proper discovery request by an opposing party."); id. R. 3.4(j) (Repl. Vol. 2010) ("A
lawyer shall not . . . [flile a suit, initiate criminal charges, assert a position, conduct a de-
fense, delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of the client when the lawyer knows or
when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure
another."); id. R. 4.1(a) (Repl. Vol. 2010) (providing that "in the course of representing a
client a lawyer shall not knowingly . . . [m]ake a false statement of fact or law"); id. R. 8.2
(Repl. Vol. 2010) ("A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false
or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integri-
ty of a judge or other judicial officer."); id. R. 8.4(a) (Repl. Vol. 2010) (providing that "[iut is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to .. . violate the Rules of Professional Conduct ...
through the acts of another"); id. R. 8.4(b) (Repl. Vol. 2010) (providing that "[iut is profes-
[Vol. 45:347356
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law for six months.7 3 The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed,
holding that a six-month suspension was reasonable in view of
the evidence and the numerous rule violations in this case.
In another Virginia State Bar disciplinary proceeding, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia found that there was no error in an order
revoking the license to practice law of an attorney who, while un-
der a prior suspension of his license to practice law, represented
himself in domestic relations proceedings during which he as-
serted persistently and repeatedly before the circuit court and the
Court of Appeals of Virginia that he was no longer required to
support his children.7 5 In light of the facts and applicable law, the
court found his position was completely frivolous and in violation
of Rule 3.1 of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct. 76 The
Court noted that "a lawyer whose license is suspended is still an
active member of the bar and, although not in good standing, is
subject to the Rules";77 and thus there was no merit to the law-
yer's constitutional challenge to the application of the Rules in
this case.78 Respondent is subject to Rule 3.1 when representing
himself.79
B. Attorney-Client Privilege Waived by Inadvertent Disclosure
In a medical malpractice case, the defendant doctor waived the
attorney-client privilege when he wrote a letter to his attorney
regarding potential negligence in his examination of key X-rays
sional misconduct for a lawyer to . .. commit a criminal or deliberately wrongful act"); id.
R. 8.4(c) (Repl. Vol. 2010) (providing that "[iut is professional misconduct for a lawyer to
... engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation").
73. Id. at 2, 694 S.E.2d at 589.
74. Id. at 5, 694 S.E.2d at 590. Moseley was found guilty of other violations including
making false and reckless statements about the judge and opposing counsel. See id. at 2-
3, 694 S.E.2d at 589.
75. Barrett v. Va. State Bar ex rel Second Dist. Comm. (Barrett II), 277 Va. 412, 412,
416-17, 675 S.E.2d 827, 828, 830 (2009). At the time this disciplinary proceeding was
pending, Mr. Barrett's law license was suspended for previous violations of the Rules of
Professional Conduct. Id. at 413, 675 S.E.2d at 828.
76. Id. at 418-19, 675 S.E.2d at 831-32 (applying R. 3.1 (Repl. Vol. 2010)).
77. Id. at 414, 675 S.E.2d at 829.
78. Id. at 416, 675 S.E.2d at 830.
79. See id. at 414, 675 S.E.2d at 829. Representing himself, Barrett argued that the
Rules '"apply only when a lawyer is representing a client, not when a lawyer represents
himself in a proceeding."' Id. (quoting Barrett v. Va. State Bar ex rel. Second Dist. Comm.
(Barrett 1), 272 Va. 260, 267, 634 S.E.2d 341, 345 (2006)). The court observed that it had
rejected this same argument in a prior case involving Mr. Barrett. Id. (quoting Barrett I,
272 Va. at 267-68, 634 S.E.2d at 345).
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and that letter was produced to the plaintiff during discovery."
While the doctor's disclosure of the letter was inadvertent, the
doctor waived his attorney-client privilege by failing to take rea-
sonable measures to ensure and maintain the confidentiality of
the letter.8 1 The Supreme Court of Virginia adopted a five-part
test for determining whether an inadvertent disclosure of a doc-
ument covered by the attorney-client privilege waives the privi-
lege.81 The court held that the attorney-client privilege had been
waived and reversed the trial court decision, applying these five
factors:
(1) the reasonableness of the precautions to prevent inadvertent dis-
closures, (2) the time taken to rectify the error, (3) the scope of the
discovery, (4) the extent of the disclosure, and (5) whether the party
asserting the claim of privilege or protection for the communication
has used its unavailability for misleading or otherwise improper or
overreaching purposes in the litigation, making it unfair to allow the
party to invoke confidentiality under the circumstances.s3
Applying these factors, the court found that the privilege was
waived because the doctor and his lawyer had not used reasona-
ble measures to prevent the inadvertent disclosure. 8 4 Neither the
doctor nor the lawyer had undertaken to review the documents
before they were produced in discovery.5 Instead, they relied on a
third-party contractor to perform the task of gathering and pro-
ducing the documents in the ordinary course of discovery.86 The
doctor and his lawyer also failed to take immediate action to rec-
tify the inadvertent disclosure.8 1 In her answers to interrogato-
ries, the plaintiff disclosed the existence of the letter the doctor
wrote to his lawyer and her reliance upon it as a basis to estab-
lish the doctor's negligence.8 8 The defendant physician and his
80. Walton v. Mid-Atlantic Spine Specialists, P.C., 280 Va. 113, 118, 694 S.E.2d 545,
547 (2010).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 126-27, 694 S.E.2d at 552.
83. Id. at 127, 694 S.E.2d at 552. Many jurisdictions now follow the five-factor test
applied by the Walton court in determining whether there is a waiver of the attorney-
client privilege when a document is ostensibly privileged but inadvertently produced to an
opponent. See Anne Jordan, Ethics, in ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY GUIDANCE 2010: WHAT
CORPORATE AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL NEED TO KNOW, at 283, 313-16 (PLI Litig. & Admin.
Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 832, 2010).
84. 280 Va. at 128-29, 694 S.E.2d at 553.
85. Id. at 128, 694 S.E.2d at 553.
86. Id. at 128-29, 694 S.E.2d at 553.
87. Id. at 129, 694 S.E.2d at 553.
88. Id.
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lawyer took no action until a year and half later when they moved
the court for a protective order. 9
C. Disciplinary Proceedings Are Not Subject to Statutes of
Limitations
In Moseley v. Virginia State Bar ex rel. Seventh District Com-
mittee, the Supreme Court of Virginia reaffirmed well-established
precedent that statutes of limitations do not apply to proceedings
to discipline a lawyer.90
D. Criminal Appeals-Neglect-Failure to Appear at Oral
Argument
Failure to appear for oral argument in two criminal appeals be-
fore the court of appeals justified holding the respondent lawyer
in contempt.9 , Based on the respondent attorney's prior discipli-
nary record, consisting of two prior public reprimands for failure
to perfect and prosecute criminal appeals, the court of appeals
suspended respondent's privilege to practice before that court for
two years.92 This decision reinforces the principle established in
In re Moseley that a court has the inherent power to discipline a
lawyer for misconduct, separate and independent from the au-
thority given the Virginia State Bar, and may suspend or revoke
that lawyer's right to practice before that particular court.93 On
April 23, 2010, the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board ("Dis-
ciplinary Board") suspended respondent's license to practice law
for sixty days for violating professional rules that govern dili-
gence and communication.9 4 The Disciplinary Board found that
89. Id.
90. Moseley v. Va. State Bar ex rel. Seventh Dist. Comm., 280 Va. 1, 4, 694 S.E.2d
586, 589 (2010) (citing Norfolk & Portsmouth Bar Ass'n v. Drewry, 161 Va. 833, 842, 172
S.E. 282, 286 (1934)).
91. In re Davey, 54 Va. App. 228, 228, 677 S.E.2d 66, 66 (Ct. App. 2009).
92. Id. at 229, 677 S.E.2d at 66.
93. In re Moseley, 273 Va. at 680, 696, 643 S.E.2d 190, 195 (2007) (citing Legal Club of
Lynchburg v. Light, 137 Va. 249, 250, 119 S.E. 55, 55 (1923)).
94. Davey, Nos. 09-090-079790 & 09-090-079865 (Va. State Bar Disciplinary Bd. Apr.
29, 2010) (order of suspension), available at http://www.vsb.org/docs/Davey-052110.pdf.
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respondent failed to perfect appeals to the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals in three criminal cases and failed to appear for oral argu-
ments in two other cases.9 5
E. Improper Criticism of Judges
In Moseley, after an evidentiary hearing in which respondent
and his client were sanctioned, Moseley wrote a letter to the
American Arbitration Association, complaining that "the circuit
court judge who had adjudicated the evidentiary hearing 'was
caught engaging in serious misconduct' and that the circuit court
judge was the subject of an investigation by the Judicial Inquiry
and Review Commission.""6 Moseley e-mailed colleagues, stating
that "the monetary sanctions award entered by the circuit court
judge was 'an absurd decision from a whacko judge, whom I be-
lieve was bribed,' and that he believed that opposing counsel was
demonically empowered.""9 A three-judge court found that Mose-
ley had violated Rules 3.3(a)(1), 3.4(e), 3.4(), 4.1(a), 8.2, and
8.4(a), (b), and (c), and suspended his license to practice law for
six months.98 Moseley argued that the charges brought by the
Virginia State Bar under Rule 8.2 were unconstitutional as he
was being punished for purely private speech, and the rule was
void for vagueness as it failed to distinguish between a lawyer's
private versus public speech.99 To these claims, the court respond-
ed:
[Plublic statements by attorneys concerning the integrity of judges
and judicial officers are not protected speech because they create a
"substantial likelihood of material prejudice to the administration of
justice." Moseley clearly made derogatory statements about the inte-
grity of the judicial officer adjudicating his matters and those state-
ments were made either with knowing falsity or with reckless disre-
gard for their truth or falsity. Therefore we hold that Moseley's
Contentions that Rule 8.2 is void for vagueness and that his state-
ments were not a proper predicate for discipline under that Rule are
without merit.'00
95. Id.
96. Moseley v. Va. State Bar ex rel. Seventh Dist. Comm. 280 Va. 1, 2, 694 S.E.2d 586,
588 (2010).
97. Id.
98. Id., 694 S.E.2d at 589 (applying VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 3.3(a)(1), 3.4(e),
3.4(j), 4.1(a), 8.2, 8.4(a)-(c) (Repl. Vol. 2010)).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 3, 694 S.E.2d at 589 (quoting Anthony v. Va. State Bar ex rel. Ninth Dist.
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The court affirmed the three-judge panel's order imposing a
six-month suspension of Moseley's law license.o1
In another recent case, while attempting to have a circuit judge
disqualified, the respondent lawyer made several remarks that
were found to have violated Rule 8.2:
"I don't feel that you're appropriate to ever hear any cases that I
might be ... defending."
"It makes me feel comfortable for you not to hear any jury trial
that I got against any of my clients."
Respondent accused [the judge] of harboring animosity toward
Respondent and implied it would cause [the judge] to treat the de-
fendant unfairly.
Respondent suggested that [the judge] was biased for the Com-
monwealth in criminal cases. 102
A three-judge court found Respondent violated Rule 3.5(f) (con-
duct intended to disrupt a tribunal) and Rule 8.2 (attacking quali-
fications or integrity of a judge). 03 Respondent defaulted on his
appeal by failing to timely file the notice of appeal with the trial
court.104
F. A Proceeding to Discipline a Lawyer is Civil in Nature
The Supreme Court of Virginia has previously stated that a
proceeding to discipline an attorney is a civil, rather than a crim-
inal or quasi-criminal, proceeding. 0 5 In Moseley, the respondent
argued that his due process rights were violated, insisting discip-
linary proceedings are quasi-criminal.10 6 Therefore, he claimed
that "the original complaint was not valid because it was not veri-
fied by an affidavit that included detailed allegations which could
Comm., 270 Va. 601, 610, 621 S.E.2d 121, 126 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
101. Id. at 5, 694 S.E.2d at 590.
102. Va. State Bar ex rel. Second Dist. Comm. v. Brown, No. CLO9-5166, slip op. at 2-3
(Va. Cir. Ct. Dec. 15, 2009) (Norfolk City) (first alteration in original).
103. Id. at 3.
104. Id., dismissed, No. 100491 (Va. Ct. App. May 10, 2010).
105. 208 Va. at 3, 694 S.E.2d at 589 (citing Norfolk & Portsmouth Bar Ass'n v. Dre-
wery, 161 Va. 833, 837, 172 S.E. 282, 284 (1934)).
106. Id. Some authority supporting Moseley's argument exists. See, e.g., In re Ruffalo,
390 U.S. 544, 551 (1968) (citation omitted) ('These are adversary proceedings of a quasi-
criminal nature.").
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not be amended during the proceedings."o7 Moseley argued the
three-judge panel "erred in failing to dismiss as invalid various
allegations that never identified the precise conduct violating the
rules."10 Although Moseley was entitled to notice of the charges of
misconduct, the court responded that "'it is only necessary that
the attorney be informed of the nature of the charge preferred
against him and be given an opportunity to answer."'109 The court
found that "Moseley had adequate notice and opportunity to an-
swer, as he was present for the proceedings and responded not
only to the charges of misconduct pending against him, but dis-
puted the underlying facts as well.""0 Further, the Court held
that the Virginia State Bar complied with Virginia Code section
54.1-3935 by verifying the district committee complaint through
an affidavit.' The court then rejected Moseley's contention that
his due process rights were violated by the panel's proceedings."'
G. Virginia State Bar Counsel's Delay in Filing Charges Not a
Basis for Dismissal Absent Showing of Prejudice
Dismissal of a complaint for failure of the Virginia State Bar to
comply with a procedural requirement of the Rules of the Su-
preme Court of Virginia is inappropriate absent some showing of
prejudice to the respondent because of the failure."3 In Green v.
Virginia State Bar, the Supreme Court of Virginia ruled a delay
for more than one year in serving the charges of misconduct is not
a basis for dismissal absent a showing that respondent was pre-
judiced by the delay."4 The court observed:
We have previously admonished the Bar for the untimely perfor-
mance of certain of its responsibilities for professional regulation in
a prior proceeding against Green, and the Court again states its dis-
approval of the Bar's delay in the certification of ethical complaints
107. 208 Va. at 3, 694 S.E.2d at 589.
108. Id.
109. Id. (quoting Seventh Dist. Comm. of the Va. State Bar v. Gunter, 212 Va. 278, 284,
183 S.E.2d 713, 717 (1971)).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See Motley v. Va. State Bar, 260 Va. 251, 257-58, 536 S.E.2d 101, 103-04 (2000)
In Motley, the Virginia State Bar sent certification to respondent eleven months after sub-
committee made the decision to certify, although the Rule at that time required only mail-
ing the complaint "promptly." Id.
114. 278 Va. 162, 172-74, 677 S.E.2d 227, 231-32 (2009).
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from a subcommittee. However, absent a showing of prejudice by the
attorney, "[a]ny betrayal of the trust which the attorney is sworn to
keep demands appropriate discipline; a delay in prosecution, without
more, cannot override this necessity. If the conduct of a member of
the bar disqualifies [the attorney] from the practice of law, it would
not be in the public interest to dismiss the disciplinary proceedings
for no reason other than the Bar's failure to prosecute [him] with the
proper dispatch." The burden of demonstrating prejudice remains on
Green, and he failed to establish how he was prejudiced by the delay
in this case."'
III. DECISIONS BY THREE-JUDGE COURTS, VIRGINIA STATE BAR
DISCIPLINARY BOARD, AND DISTRICT COMMITTEES
A. Authority of Virginia State Bar Counsel to Dismiss or
Withdraw Charges of Misconduct
In a recent case, a three-judge court acknowledged that pursuant
to part 6, section IV, paragraph 13.B.7a(1) of the Rules of the Su-
preme Court of Virginia, "Bar Counsel is given the authority to 'in-
itiate, investigate, present or prosecute Complaints' and to 'act in-
dependently and exercise prosecutorial autonomy and discre-
tion."'116 In granting Virginia State Bar Counsel's motion to dismiss,
the three-judge court found that "[finherent within ... [the Virginia
State Bar's] authority is the authority to move the court to dismiss
a complaint with prejudice.""
B. Fees and Fee Agreements
Because of the lawyer's fiduciary relationship with a client, the
fee agreement between the lawyer and the client is not governed
solely by the law applicable to ordinary commercial contracts."8
115. Id. at 173-74, 677 S.E.2d at 232 (alteration in original) (quoting In re Williams,
513 A.2d 793, 796, 797 (D.C. 1986)) (citing Green v. Va. State Bar, 274 Va. 775, 786, 652
S.E. 2d 118, 123 (2007)).
116. Va. State Bar ex rel. Third Dist. Comm. Section III v. Corcoran, No. CLO7-2749-3,
slip op. at 2 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 2, 2007) (Richmond City) (quoting VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § IV,
Para. 13B.7a(1) (Repl. Vol. 2007)).
117. Id.
118. It is a misconception to attempt to force an agreement between an attorney
and his client into the conventional modes of commercial contracts. While such
a contract may have similar attributes, the agreement is, essentially, in a clas-
sification peculiar to itself. Such an agreement is permeated with the para-
mount relationship of attorney and client which necessarily affects the rights
and duties of each.
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Consequently, certain provisions in a contract with a client may
be held unethical even if the client has agreed to a particular
term or condition.
In a recent decision, respondent's agreement with a client sti-
pulated that unpaid legal fees could not be discharged in bank-
ruptcy and permitted the lawyer to charge the client for time
spent defending and responding to any bar investigation.119 In
this case, the Disciplinary Board found the respondent lawyer vi-
olated Rules 1.5, 1.7(a)(2) and 8.4 of the Virginia Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct.120
Some lawyers include in their contract with a client a provision
stating that certain fees are "minimum" or "nonrefundable." Non-
refundable advanced legal fees are improper because they poten-
tially violate the rule requiring an attorney who has been dis-
charged to refund any advanced legal fee that has not been
earned,121 and because "[a] fee that is not earned is per se an un-
reasonable fee."12 2 The Virginia State Bar Committee on Legal
Ethics "has previously opined and continues to be of the opinion
that any fee arrangement involving advanced legal fees and pro-
viding for a non-refundable or minimum fee violates the Discipli-
nary Rules and is thus improper."123 In a recent disciplinary case,
a lawyer received a public reprimand with terms for using nonre-
fundable fee provisions in contracts with clients, in violation of
Rules 1.5 and 8.4(a).124 In another recent case involving abuse of
legal fees, the Disciplinary Board found the respondent lawyer vi-
olated Rule 1.5 by charging a client for time spent preparing for
and appearing at a motion to withdraw from the client's case.' 2 5
Heinzman v. Fine, Fine, Legum & Fine, 217 Va. 958, 962-63, 234 S.E.2d 282, 285 (1977)
(quoting Krippner v. Matz, 287 N.W. 19, 24 (Minn. 1939)).
119. Gay, No. 08-022-073165 (Va. State Bar Disciplinary Bd. Feb. 17, 2010) (order),
available at www.vsb.org/docs/Gay-02-2 1- 10.pdf.
120. Id.
121. R. 1.16(d) (Repl. Vol. 2010) (requiring the lawyer, upon termination of representa-
tion to, inter alia, refund unearned legal fees to the client).
122. See VA. CODE ANN. L. Ethics Op. 1606 (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Cum. Supp. 2010).
123. Id.
124. Oulton, No. 05-032-3243 (Va. State Bar Third Dist. Subcomm. Sept. 19, 2008)
(subcommittee determination (public admonition with terms)), available at www.vsb.
org/docs/Oulton_11-20-08.pdf (discussing, inter alia, R. 1.5, R. 8.4(a) (Repl. Vol. 2010)).
While Rule 1.5(a) requires that legal fees be reasonable, comment 4 to Rule 1.5 states (in
part) that "[a] lawyer may require advance payment of a fee but is obliged to return any
unearned portion." R. 1.5(a) cmt. 4 (Repl. Vol. 2010).
125. Gay, No. 08-022-073165 (Va. State Bar Disciplinary Bd. Jan. 22, 2010) (order),
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C. Duty to Pay Medical Liens
A three-judge court ruled that a lawyer violates Rule 1. 15(c)(4)
if he refuses to honor a chiropractor's consensual lien or assign-
ment of benefits with a client, which directs the client's lawyer to
pay the total bill owed to the chiropractor out of the settlement of
the client's personal injury case. 2 6 Although the lawyer was not a
party to the assignment of benefits,127 the lawyer knew that the
client had contracted with his chiropractor to pay the medical bill
out of settlement.28 When the chiropractor refused to reduce his
bill, the lawyer unilaterally arbitrated the dispute by disbursing
to the chiropractor an amount less than what was owed.129 A
three-judge court ruled the lawyer failed to either hold the
amount in dispute in trust until the client and chiropractor could
resolve their dispute or interplead the disputed funds into
court.' This was an appeal from a district committee determina-
tion. '3 The court cited with approval Legal Ethics Opinion 1747
and comment 4 to Rule 1.15 and affirmed the district committee's
finding of misconduct, but reduced the sanction from a public
admonition to a dismissal de minimis.32
D. Neglect: Withholding Services Until Client Pays Overdue Fees
In a separate case, the Disciplinary Board concluded that res-
pondent lawyer violated Rules 1.16, 1.3, 1.7, and 8.4(a) and (b) by
withholding services because the client was delinquent in paying
the respondent's fees.13 3 Based on the client's failure to pay out-
standing legal fees, the respondent lawyer withheld submitting a
sketch final decree of divorce to the court for entry and failed to
available at www.vsb.org/docs/Gay_02-21-10.
126. See Va. State Bar ex rel. Third Dist. Comm. v. Johnson, No. CLO9-2034-4, slip op.
at 14 (Cir. Ct. July 14, 2009) (Richmond City) (applying R. 1.15(c)(4) (Repl. Vol. 2010)),
available at www.vsb.org/docs/Johnson_08-24-09.pdf.
127. Id. at 13.
128. Id. at 5.
129. Id. at 6, 13.
130. Id. at 6.
131. Id. at 1.
132. Id. at 9-11, 15 (citing, inter alia, VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § 11, R. 1.15 cmt. 4 (Repl.
Vol. 2009); VA. CODE ANN. L. Ethics Op. 1747 (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Cum. Supp. 2010)).
133. Gay, No. 08-022-073165 (Va. State Bar Disciplinary Bd. Jan. 22, 2010) (order),
available at www.vsb.org/docs/Gay_02-21-10. The supreme court dismissed his appeal on
April 30, 2010. Gay v. Va. State Bar, No. 100656 (Va. dismissed Apr. 30, 2010).
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withdraw for a period of fourteen-and-one-half months.13 The di-
vorce could have been completed, in the respondent's own estima-
tion, in "one billable hour."' 35 Nevertheless, the respondent lawyer
refused to proceed until he was paid in full. 136 The client had pro-
posed to pay her obligation from the proceeds she anticipated re-
ceiving from her ex-husband's military pension upon entry of the
final decree. 37
E. Notary Misconduct-Lawyer Serving as Notary-False
Acknowledgments
In a separate decision, respondent, acting as a notary, falsely
certified that persons who had signed a "Deed of Dedication and
Easement" had appeared before him to acknowledge their signa-
tures."3 A three-judge court subsequently approved an agreed-
upon disposition for public reprimand.13
IV. LEGAL ETHICS OPINIONS ISSUED BY THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR
STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL ETHICS
A. Confidentiality-Obligations of Lawyers When Using Internet
Web Pages to Communicate with Prospective Clients
The duty of confidentiality attaches "when the lawyer agrees to
consider whether a client-lawyer relationship shall be estab-
lished."40 Nevertheless, lawyers may use to their client's advan-
tage (and represent the adversary of a prospective client who
sent) a prospective client's: (1) unsolicited voicemail message con-
taining confidential information, sent to a lawyer who advertises
in the local Yellow Pages and includes his office address and tele-
phone number; and (2) unsolicited e-mail containing confidential
information, sent to a law firm that "maintains a passive website
which does not specifically invite consumers to submit confiden-
tial information for evaluation or to contact members of the firm
134. Gay, No. 08-022-073165, at 5, 8.
135. Id. at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 6.
138. Va. State Bar ex rel. Fifth Dist.-Section III Comm. v. Compton, No. 69168, slip
op. at 2-3 (Cir. Ct. Oct. 9, 2007) (Prince William County).
139. Id. at 5.
140. VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, Preamble (Repl. Vol. 2010).
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by e-mail."141 Someone submitting such confidential information
does not have a reasonable basis for believing that the lawyer will
maintain the confidentiality of the information simply because
the lawyer uses "a public listing in a directory" or a passive web-
site.142 The lawyer in that situation "ha[d] no opportunity to con-
trol or prevent the receipt of that information," and "it would be
unjust for an individual to foist upon an unsuspecting lawyer a
duty of confidentiality, or worse yet, a duty to withdraw from the
representation of an existing client."143 Lawyers might create a
reasonable expectation of confidentiality if they include language
in advertisements or on their website that implies "the lawyer is
agreeing to accept confidential information."144 In contrast to law-
yers who merely advertise in the Yellow Pages or maintain a pas-
sive website, a lawyer that "offers to provide prospective clients a
free evaluation of their claims" would have to keep information
provided by a prospective client who completes an online form on
a law firm website confidential, and would be prohibited from
representing a client adverse to a prospective client which sup-
plies such information.145 Law firms may wish to consider includ-
ing appropriate disclaimers on their website or external voicemail
greeting, or including a "click-through" disclaimer "clearly worded
so as to overcome a reasonable belief on the part of the prospec-
tive client that the information will be maintained as confiden-
tial"146
B. Patent Lawyer Forming Partnership with Non-Lawyer Patent
Agent
Federal regulations governing lawyers practicing before the
United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") permit
forming partnerships and sharing fees between attorneys and
registered patent agents to the extent the shared fees arise from
the practice of patent law before the USPTO.147 As a result, the
141. VA. CODE ANN. L. Ethics Op. 1842 (Cum. Supp. 2010).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. 37 C.F.R. § 10.48 permits a lawyer/practitioner to share legal fees with a non-
lawyer practitioner. 37 C.F.R. § 10.48 (2009). 37 C.F.R. § 10.49 allows the formation of a
partnership among lawyer and nonlawyer "practitioners" as long as the activities of that
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patent lawyer can join the practice of a nonlawyer patent agent
either as a registered active Virginia lawyer or an associate
member of the Virginia State Bar, as long as that practice is de-
voted solely to patent law before the USPTO.14
C. Lawyer Serving as Guardian Ad Litem for Child-Duty to
Investigate and Report Child Abuse
A lawyer is appointed to serve as a guardian ad litem ("GAL")
for a seven-year-old girl who is a suspected victim of abuse by her
father.149 The girl asked the lawyer not to disclose her father's ab-
usive behavior, which the father denies.15o The lawyer must bal-
ance the duty of confidentiality under Rule 1.6 151 with his role as a
GAL under Rule 8:6.152 "[L]awyers serving as GALs are subject to
the Rules of Professional Conduct as they would be in any other
case, except when the special duties of a GAL conflict with such
rules."56 However, the GAL's compliance with the Supreme Court
of Virginia's Rule 8:6 and the Standards to Govern the Perfor-
mance of Guardians Ad Litem for Children'5 ' may justify the dis-
partnership consist solely of the practice of patent law before the USPTO. Id. § 10.49
(2009).
148. See VA. CODE ANN. L. Ethics Op. 1843 (Cum. Supp. 2010).
149. See id. L. Ethics Op. 1844 (Cum. Supp. 2010).
150. Id.
151. Rule 1.6 states:
A lawyer shall not reveal information protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege under applicable law or other information gained in the professional re-
lationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of
which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the
client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that
are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except
as stated in paragraphs (b) and (c).
VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.6(a) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
152. Id. pt. 8, R. 8.6 (Repl. Vol. 2010).
153. VA. CODE ANN. L. Ethics Op. 1844 (Supp. 2010); see also id. L. Ethics Op. 1729
(Repl. Vol. 2002) ("[The relationship of the GAL and child is different from the relation-
ship of attorney and client. In reconciling the differences between the traditional ethical
duties an attorney owes to a client, and the legal obligations that a GAL must discharge,
the committee believes that where fulfilling a specific duty of the guardian ad litem con-
flicts with the traditional duties required of an attorney under the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the specific duty of the guardian ad litem should prevail. When the duties
do not conflict, the GAL should follow traditional course of action required under the Code
of Professional Responsibility.").
154. See OFFICE OF THE EXEC. SEC'Y, SUPREME COURT OF VA., STANDARDS TO GOVERN
THE PERFORMANCE OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR CHILDREN (2003) [hereinafter
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS], available at http://www.courts.state.va.us/courtadminlaoc/cip/
programs/gal/children/galperformance-standards-children.pdf; STANDARDS TO GOVERN
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closure of confidential information pursuant to Rule 1.6(b)(1),
which allows the disclosure of confidences "to comply with law" or
a court order."5 5 "For example, the GAL may learn from the child
that a custodian is taking illegal drugs and may use that infor-
mation to request that the court order drug testing of the custo-
dian."156 According to the opinion, because "the GAL not only
serves as the child's advocate but is obliged to identify and rec-
ommend the outcome that best serves the child's interests," the
GAL "needs to investigate information obtained from and about
the child in order to ascertain certain facts," after which the GAL
can assess "the risk of probable harm to the child" and then de-
termine "whether the GAL has a duty, as an advocate for the
child's best interests, to disclose to the court or appropriate au-
thority information necessary to safeguard the best interests of
the child."'5 7 This disclosure would be permitted under Rule
1.6(b)(1), where a lawyer can reveal protected information "to the
extent reasonably necessary to comply with law."15
D. Use of Covert Tactics by Virginia State Bar Staff to Investigate
Unauthorized Practice of Law
Virginia State Bar staff lawyers may direct and supervise non-
lawyer bar investigators, outside investigators, or volunteers who
"engage in covert investigative techniques in the investigation of
the unauthorized practice of law in any case in which no other
reasonable alternative is available to obtain information against
THE APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS AD LITEM PURSUANT TO § 16.1-266, CODE OF VIRGINIA
(2009) [hereinafter APPOINTMENT STANDARDS], available at http://www.courts.state.va.us/
courtadminlaoc/cip/programs/gal/children/gal standardschildren.pdf. The Performance
Standards and the Appointment Standards outline the specific duties and qualifications of
a GAL appointed by the court. The Performance Standards inform Virginia courts as to
the expectations regarding the conduct of GALS and provide additional guidance for GAL's
conduct. In addition, the Performance Standards augment the policies governing the qua-
lifications of attorneys as GALs. These documents were formally adopted by the Judicial
Council of Virginia and reviewed by the Supreme Court of Virginia and became effective in
September of 2003. See JUDICIAL COUNSEL OF VIRGINIA, REPORT TO THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY AND SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA 49 (2003), available at www.courts.state.va.
us/Courtadmin/judpolicies/2003jcvreport.pdf. Additional amendments to the APPOINT-
MENT STANDARDS became effective January 1, 2009. See APPOINTMENT STANDARDS, supra.
155. VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 1.6(b)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2010); see also VA. CODE ANN. L.
Ethics Op. 1844 (Cum. Supp. 2010).
156. PERFORMANCE STANDARDS, supra note 154, at S-6.
157. L. Ethics Op. 1844 (Cum. Supp. 2010).
158. Id.
2010] 369
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
the person engaging in the unauthorized practice of law."159 For
example, they may undertake a covert investigation of a paraleg-
al's reported preparation of wills and powers of attorney ("POAs")
without a lawyer's direct supervision (which would amount to a
criminal act) .160 The committee worried that "because of the ab-
sence of witnesses who can testify or produce substantive evi-
dence," the Virginia State Bar might not be able to undertake en-
forcement actions against the paralegal.161 The Virginia State Bar
proposed to direct a nonlawyer to contact the paralegal "under
the pretext of wanting a will and/or POA prepared, collect and
pay for these services, and report back the results."16 2 Lawyers di-
recting and supervising such a covert operation would not violate
Virginia Rule 8.4(c), because such behavior would not reflect ad-
versely on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.163 Virginia's unique
comment 1 to Rule 5.3 specifically approves traditionally permiss-
ible activity such as law enforcement investigations and housing
discrimination tests.164 Earlier legal ethics opinions have also rec-
ognized a "law enforcement" exception to Rule 8.4(c)'s general
prohibition on deception. 6 5
159. L. Ethics Op. 1845 (Cum. Supp. 2010).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. (applying VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 8.4(c) (Repl. Vol. 2010) (prohibiting con-
duct "involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation which reflects adversely on
the lawyer's fitness to practice law")). Since the type of undercover investigation proposed
in Legal Ethics Opinion 1845 involves misrepresentation of identity and purpose by the
investigator, there is an element of misrepresentation or deceit, but it would not "reflect[]
adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice law" under the circumstances presented in
this opinion. Id.
164. The comment states:
Lawyers generally employ assistants in their practice, including secretaries,
investigators, law student interns, and paraprofessionals. Such assistants,
whether employees or independent contractors, act for the lawyer in rendi-
tion of the lawyer's professional services. A lawyer should give such assis-
tants appropriate instruction and supervision concerning the ethical aspects
of their employment, particularly regarding the obligation not to disclose in-
formation relating to representation of the client, and should be responsible
for their work product. The measures employed in supervising nonlawyers
should take account of the fact that they do not have legal training and are
not subject to professional discipline. At the same time, however, the Rule is
not intended to preclude traditionally permissible activity such as misrepre-
sentation by a nonlawyer of one's role in a law enforcement investigation or a
housing discrimination "test."
R. 5.3 cmt. 1 (Repl. Vol. 2010).
165. See, e.g., L. Ethics Op. 1738 (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Cum. Supp. 2010) (lawyers and
agents involved in law enforcement and housing discrimination have traditionally em-
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E. Lawyer Participating in "Lead-Sharing" Organization With
Other Professionals
Lawyers may not join a lead-sharing organization'66 in which
membership is often dependent on the number of leads a member
passes, because such "reciprocal referrals amount [ ] to a quid pro
quo payment for services" in violation of the prohibition on pro-
viding something of value in return for a referral.'' Such partici-
pation puts the client's "interests at risk" because the lawyer
"may be obligated to refer a client to a particular member special-
ist when a non-member specialist may be better suited to meet
the client's needs."116 The lawyer faces a personal conflict of inter-
est because the lawyer may not feel free "to choose the most ap-
propriate specialty provider for a client."69 The committee ob-
served that "[t]he mere disclosure of a client's name and specific
need in certain circumstances may be enough to violate [Rule 1.6]
without consent of the client."17o A lawyer may own an interest in
a company that is a lead-sharing organization as long as the law-
yer is not a member.'' Lawyers may also engage in voluntary re-
ferrals to other lawyers and professionals, but may not join "a hy-
pothetical organization which bases membership on a commit-
ment to provide referrals."172
ployed artiface and deception in undercover law enforcement investigations and such tra-
ditional investigative procedures have been accepted by the courts as permissible activity);
id. L. Ethics Op. 1765 (Cum. Supp. 2010) (lawyer employed as intelligence agent for gov-
ernment may use deception to gather information without violating ethics rules).
166. A "lead-sharing" organization is a profit or non-profit organization in which mem-
bers of various professions share 'leads" (potential clients or customers) between each oth-
er. See id. L. Ethics Op. 1846 (Cum. Supp. 2010).
167. Id. Rule 7.3(d) states that:
A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to a person or organ-
ization to recommend or secure employment by a client, or as a reward for
having made a recommendation resulting in employment by a client, except
that the lawyer may pay for public communications permitted by Rule 7.1
and 7.2 and the usual and reasonable fees or dues charged by a lawyer refer-
ral service and any qualified legal services plan or contract of legal services
insurance as authorized by law, provided that such communications of the
service or plan are in accordance with the standards of this Rule or Rule 7.1
and 7.2, as appropriate.
R. 7.3(d) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
168. L. Ethics Op. 1846 (Cum. Supp. 2010).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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F. Use of Credit Cards for Payment for Legal Services
After receiving an opinion from Virginia's Attorney General,
the Standing Committee on Legal Ethics approved Virginia law-
yers passing along to their client the transactional costs and mer-
chant fees charged by a credit card company when the client uses
a credit card, as long as the lawyer explains the process to the
client before the client uses the credit card.13 Such transactional
and service fees may be deducted from the lawyer's trust account,
but lawyers using best practices should arrange for the fees to be
deducted from the lawyers' operating account.7 4 Lawyers "must
monitor and personally replace any escrow funds that are sub-
jected to a chargeback" by a credit card company, and lawyers us-
ing best practices should arrange for any chargebacks to come
from their operating account rather than their trust account. '7
G. Employment Restrictions for Suspended or Disbarred Lawyers
Rule 5.5(a) prohibits a law firm from employing "in any capaci-
ty a lawyer whose license is suspended or revoked ... if the dis-
ciplined lawyer was associated with such lawyer, law firm, or pro-
fessional corporation at any time on or after the date of the acts
which resulted in suspension or revocation."7r The language of
Rule 5.5(a), stating the date of the acts "which resulted in sus-
pension or revocation" means "the date of the alleged misconduct
or acts upon which the lawyer's suspension or revocation is
based."'77 Determination of the actual date is both a factual and
legal determination made by a disciplinary tribunal and beyond
the Standing Committee on Legal Ethics's purview. 7 8 A law firm
not subject to the hiring prohibition in Rule 5.5(a) may hire the
disciplined lawyer as a consultant, law clerk, or legal assistant,
provided the hiring firm does not then represent any former or
current clients of the disciplined lawyer or clients of the lawyers
or law firms prohibited from hiring the disciplined lawyer in any
173. See id. L. Ethics Op. 1848 (Cum. Supp. 2010).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, R. 5.5(a) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
177. L. Ethics Op. 1852 (Cum. Supp. 2010) (discussing R. 5.5(a) (Repl. Vol. 2010)).
178. Id.
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capacity. 79 Additionally, "nothing would prohibit the suspended
or disbarred lawyer from owning or being employed by a business
providing non-legal services as long as that business is not em-
ployed by one of the lawyer's former law firms."iso
H. Sexual Relationships With Clients
According to the Virginia State Bar's Ethics Committee, nu-
merous issues develop "when a lawyer enters into a sexual rela-
tionship with a client during the course of the representation."s'
The ethical issues occurring due to such situations do not require
a description or definition of "the actual acts of the lawyer nor
what defines a 'sexual relationship."1s2 Upon being requested to
address the issue, the Standing Committee on Legal Ethics found
that "impropriety and unfair exploitation of the lawyer's fiduciary
position as well as the lawyer's untold influence and potential
personal conflict" were frequently the root of the problem.8 3 As
the ABA's Standing Committee on Legal Ethics identified in
Formal Opinion 92-364, "[t]he roles of lover and lawyer are poten-
tially conflicting ones as the emotional involvement that is fos-
179. L. Ethics Op. 1852 (Cum. Supp. 2010). The Committee applied Rule 5.5(b), which
states
[a] lawyer, law firm or professional corporation employing a lawyer as a con-
sultant, law clerk, or legal assistant when that lawyer's license is suspended
or revoked for professional misconduct shall not represent any client
represented by the disciplined lawyer or by any lawyer with whom the discip-
lined lawyer practiced on or after the date of the acts which resulted in sus-
pension or revocation.
R. 5.5(b) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
180. L. Ethics Op. 1852 (Cum. Supp. 2010).
181. Id. L. Ethics Op. 1853 (Cum. Supp. 2010).
182. Id.
183. Id. The Ethics Committee elaborated further:
A client may not feel free to rebuff a lawyer's unwanted advances for fear the
rejection will reduce the lawyer's attention to the case or cause the client to
find a new lawyer. Mr. Compton stipulated in an agreed disposition that he
engaged in sexual conduct with clients while employed at a licensed legal aid
society. On December 15, 2008, a three-judge panel of the Dickenson County
Circuit Court suspended Wade Trent Compton's license to practice law for
five years with terms for violating professional rules that govern conflict of
interest and misconduct that involves a criminal or deliberately wrongful act
that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as
a lawyer. Clients in emotionally traumatic domestic relations and criminal
cases may be psychologically distressed, weakened and vulnerable, and the
lawyer can become a powerful figure who can victimize the client by exploit-
ing the weakness.
Id. at n.12 (citations omitted).
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tered by a sexual relationship has the potential to undercut the
objective detachment that is often demanded for adequate repre-
sentation."184 The Virginia Bar's Ethics Committee advises that
[w]hile distinctions may be drawn between sexual relationships that
predate the formation of the attorney/client relationship and those
that begin during the attorney-client relationship, the lawyer must
always be mindful of the ethical considerations involved. Clearly, the
situation where the sexual relationship develops during the attor-
ney-client relationship risks more probable ethical breaches and in
most instances forms the basis for lawyer discipline.'a
It is evident that engaging in a sexual relationship with a
client during the course of representation may be seriously de-
trimental to the client's interests.186 The many ethical duties of an
attorney to a client "are so fundamental to the attorney-client re-
lationship that obtaining the client's purported consent to enter-
ing into a sexual relationship with the lawyer will rarely be suffi-
cient to eliminate any potential ethical violation."'8 An attorney
should avoid any involvement in a sexual relationship with a
client.18 A client's consent does not absolve the lawyer of liability
because, "[i]n most situations, the client's ability to give the in-
formed consent required by Rule 1.7(b) is overwhelmed by the
lawyer's position of power and influence in the relationship and
the client's emotional vulnerability."'8 9
184. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-364 (1992).
185. L. Ethics Op. 1853 (Cum. Supp. 2010).
186. Id.
187. Id. For a list of "reported disciplinary cases" discussing the possibility of miscon-
struing consent, see id. at n.3.
Id.
188. Id.
189. Id; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-364,
(1992) ("An individual client, in particular, is likely to have retained a lawyer at a time of
crisis. The divorce client's marriage is disintegrating. The criminal client may have just
been arrested and could be facing the possibility of jail. The probate client is dealing with
the loss of a loved one. The immigration client may fear deportation. Other client's may be
trying to save a business or salvage a reputation. The corporate employee may see his or
her employment on the line, depending on the outcome of the transaction or litigation.
.. 1)
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V. EMERGING DEVELOPMENTS IN PROFESSIONAL REGULATION
A. ABA Amends Model Rule 1.10 to Allow Screening to Avoid
Conflicts Created by Lateral Hiring
Recognizing that most lawyers in private practice will change
law firms several times over the course of their careers, to pro-
mote lawyer mobility, the ABA's Standing Committee on Legal
Ethics and Professionalism proposed amendments to Model Rule
1.10190 that would avoid imputation of a conflict resulting from a
lawyer changing firms.'9' The ABA's House of Delegates adopted
the amendments in 2009.192 Under the amended rule, a law firm
may hire opposing counsel in a pending matter, without client
consent or even over the client's objection, provided the law firm
190. The text of the rule reads:
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly
represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited
from doing so by Rules 1.7 or 1.9, unless
(1) the prohibition is based on a personal interest of the disqualified
lawyer and does not present a significant risk of materially limiting
the representation of the client by the remaining lawyers in the firm;
or
(2) the prohibition is based upon Rule 1.9(a) or (b) and arises out of the
disqualified lawyer's association with a prior firm, and
(i) the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participa-
tion in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee there-
from;
(ii) written notice is promptly given to any affected former client
to enable the former client to ascertain compliance with the pro-
visions of this Rule, which shall include a description of the
screening procedures employed; a statement of the firm's and of
the screened lawyer's compliance with these Rules; a statement
that review may be available before a tribunal; and an agree-
ment by the firm to respond promptly to any written inquiries or
objections by the former client about the screening procedures;
and
(iii) certifications of compliance with these Rules and with the
screening procedures are provided to the former client by the
screened lawyer and by a partner of the firm, at reasonable in-
tervals upon the former client's written request and upon termi-
nation of the screening procedures.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (1983) (amended 2009).
191. See Jeffrey B. Tracy, Model Rule 1.10 Amendments Affect Lateral Moves, LITIG.
NEWS, Spring 2009, at 4, 4.
192. American Bar Association Resolution Amending Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct Rule 1.10 (Feb. 16, 2009), available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2009/mid
year/dailyjournal/Adoptedl09.doc.
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timely "screens" the lateral hire and gives notice to the lateral
hire's former client.9 3
B. ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20
In 2009, then ABA President Carolyn Lamm, a partner at
White & Case, appointed a special commission to reevaluate the
Model Rules and other professional regulation of lawyers in the
United States in view of recent developments in both the United
States and abroad including: licensing and admission of foreign
lawyers; choice of law in transnational practice; alternative busi-
ness structures for the delivery of legal services (including public-
ly held law firms); third party loans, investments, or alternative
financing for litigation matters; regulation of inbound foreign
lawyers; technology and the regulation of the practice of law; do-
mestic and international outsourcing of legal services; and choice
of law issues for conflicts. 9 4
VI. CONCLUSION
Rapid changes in technology and the means by which legal ser-
vices are delivered continue to outpace the organized bar's ability
to regulate the practice of law. The challenge for regulatory bars
will be to promulgate and enforce rules that accommodate rather
than restrict appropriate changes in the legal marketplace, while
at the same time fulfilling their mission to protect the public from
lawyer misconduct and instill confidence in the administration of
justice.
193. Tracy, supra note 192 ('The proposal adopted by the Delegates, Recommendation
109, enables a law firm to 'screen' the incoming attorney from representation adverse to
the former client to allow the firm to continue representing its client without the consent
of the incoming attorney's former client. The Standing Committee's proposal eliminates
the need for client consent.").
194. See generally News Release, Am. Bar Ass'n, ABA President Carolyn B. Lamm
Creates Ethics Commission to Address Technology and Global Practice Challenges Facing
U.S. Lawyers (Aug. 4, 2009), available at http://www.abanet.orglabanet/medialrelease/
newsrelease.cfm?releaseid=730; ABA Comm'n on Ethics 20/20, AM. BAR ASS'N, http://
www.abanet.orglethics 2020/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2010); ABA Comm'n on Ethics 20/20,
Message from Commission on Ethics 20/20 Co-Chairs Jamie S. Gorelick and Michael
Traynor, AM. BAR AsS'N, http://www.abanet.orglethics2020/chairs.html (last visited Oct.
30, 2010); ABA Presidential Commissions-Carolyn B. Lamm, Office of the President, AM.
BAR. AsS'N, http://www.abanet.org/op/lamm/presidentialcommissions.shtml (last visited
Oct. 30, 2010).
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